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Framing Accountability and Transparency
in Nonprofit Organizations
Although the roots of corporate-governance
research can be traced back to at least Berle and
Means (1932), subsequent literature has mainly
focused on firms. Publicly traded companies,
where control over capital by professional managers is separated from ownership of capital by
shareholders, have been particularly studied in
order to understand and to design mechanisms to
mitigate agency problems, i.e. conflicts of interest
arising between principals (shareholders) and
agents (managers). The concept of transparency
in the business sector has been extended into a
complex information infrastructure where financial accounting information is only one of the
elements. It has been defined as “the widespread
availability of relevant, reliable information about
the periodic performance, financial position,
investment opportunities, governance, value, and
risk” of firms (Bushman & Smith, 2003).
Not until the 1980s did literature on the specificities of governance of nonprofit organizations gain
momentum in the U.S., led by such institutions
as Boardsource (Rey-Garcia & Martin-Cavanna,
2011). Since then, accountability and transparency have progressively overshadowed other aspects
of nonprofit governance, such as the responsibilities and internal functioning of boards or the
evaluation of their performance. They have thus
become the focus of practitioners’ interest and
academic literature during the last decade (Dautel
THE
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Key Points
· This article explores the mix of forces explaining variability in good-governance standards and
practices by charitable foundations.
· A six-drivers framework for explaining improved
foundation accountability and transparency is proposed and discussed in the context of a country
study. Those drivers are: regulatory pressures,
self-regulation, demands for information from
donors and other relevant stakeholders, societal
pressure derived from scandals, emulation, and
third-party assessment.
· A simple tool for assessing foundation transparency internationally is proposed and then applied
to corporate, endowed, and fundraising foundations in the U.S. and Spain.
· Foundations’ financial structure compounds with
institutional factors to influence the stage of development of transparency practices, as demands for
information from external donors are key.
· Benchmarking reports by a third-party information
service, providing incentives for peer emulation,
seem to be a key driver for increased transparency
in the case of Spanish corporate foundations.
· Implications for foundation practitioners follow,
both relative to foundation transparency assessment and advancement in general, and, in
particular, to good governance and accountability
of corporate and other closely held foundations.

& Brudney, 2003; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Brown &
Iverson, 2004; Bobowick, 2009).

77

Rey-Garcia, Martin-Cavanna, and Alvarez-Gonzalez

Nonprofits may not be more prone to scandal
than other types of organizations, but their public-benefit mission and their societal status render
them more susceptible to public disappointment.
Another, highly sensitive, differential feature consists of the tax relief available to nonprofits that
comply with certain requirements. This ultimately
leads their accountability and transparency duties
to resemble those of public bodies, subject only to
constraints imposed by the need for confidentiality, if social trust is to be maintained (Leat, 1994;
Salamon, 1995).
In fact, nonprofits have come under increased
public scrutiny and criticism in the past few
decades. The risk of perceived financial abuse and
mismanagement has been fueled by publicized
and recurring episodes of wrongdoing involving, for example, executive compensation and
conflicts of interest by board members in the
early 1990s and international nongovernmental
organizations in the new millennium (Gibelman & Gelman, 2004). The economic crisis has
heightened public sensitivity to governance-related issues. The broader wave of public concern
over scandals in the business and public sectors,
dating to the Enron and WorldCom scandals and
the subsequent Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, has
also contributed. Consequences internationally
for nonprofits, charitable foundations included,
have been notorious: increased public distrust,
more regulation by public authorities (in the U.S.,
recurring efforts to make tax exemptions and
deductions more stringent), and more self-regulation, including the adoption of ethics and goodgovernance codes (Herzlinger, 1996; Independent
Sector, 2007; Warren & Lloyd, 2009).
As a result of these social, ethical, and regulatory forces, all nonprofits are being held increasingly accountable for their finances, governance,
performance, and mission (Behn, 2001; Ebrahim,
2010). Accountability has been generally defined
as “the processes through which an organization
makes a commitment to respond to and balance
the needs of stakeholders in its decision-making
processes and activities, and delivers against this
commitment” (Lloyd, Oatham, & Hammer, 2007,
p. 11). As nonprofit organizations face demands
for accountability from multiple actors, those de78

mands vary widely depending on the nature of the
relationship and the type of nonprofit. Differences
have been among upward (to donors, regulators,
supervisory authorities), downward (to customers/beneficiaries, public at large), and internal
accountability, and among accountability from
membership organizations, service organizations,
and policy-advocacy networks (Ebrahim, 2010).
If accountability is a prerequisite for trust,
transparency is a prerequisite for accountability.
Transparency has been included among core
components of accountability, together with
answerability or justification, compliance, and
enforcement or sanctions. It has been defined
as a process that involves collecting and making
accessible for public scrutiny relevant information
about the nonprofit, both in terms of governance
and management: “relevant” meaning information that satisfies the expectations of internal
and external stakeholders (Ebrahim & Weisband,
2007; Montserrat, 2009).

The Relevance of Foundation
Accountability and Transparency
Charitable foundations not only belong to the
nonprofit sector as public-purpose, self-governed,
and nonprofit distributing entities, but they also
occupy a central position within it because many
make grants to other nonprofits (Prewitt, 2006).
Foundation accountability has been defined as
“an obligation or willingness of public benefit
foundations to account for their actions towards
their stakeholders”; for the purpose of this article,
foundation transparency will be defined as “an
obligation or willingness of public benefit foundations to publish and make available relevant
data to stakeholders and the public” (European
Foundation Center & Donors and Foundations
Networks in Europe [EFC/DAFNE], 2011, p. 6).
Foundations, like other nonprofits, have been
subjected to increasing demands for accountability in all Western countries. Across Europe,
regulatory and tax legislation and self-regulation
initiatives are incipiently and heterogeneously
framing requirements for accountability and
transparency from public-benefit foundations
(EFC/DAFNE, 2011). Previous literature adds two
foundation-specific arguments for increased relTHE
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evance of nonprofit accountability: Foundations
are largely undemocratic institutions applying
tax-protected resources to promote their private
vision of the public good in the public arena, and
foundations create a state-protected power asymmetry between those who control resources and
those who seek them (Prewitt, 2006).
We further contend that accountability and
transparency are relatively more crucial prerequisites for good governance in foundations given
their nonproprietary, nonmembership nature.
Foundations represent an extreme case of agency
problem: Their boards aren’t answerable to owners (unlike businesses) or members (unlike associations or cooperatives) that have an incentive to
control their actions (Hopt, Walz, Von Hippel, &
Then, 2006). Good governance of the foundation
essentially depends on the ethical standing of its
board (EFC/DAFNE, 2011).
The focus of our empirical exercise will be on the
state and evolution of transparency in corporate
or company-sponsored foundations. There is
no consensual or legal definition for corporate
foundations that can be applied internationally.
In the U.S., corporate foundations are separate
legal entities that receive their assets or annual
gifts from a (generally publicly held) company,
thus remaining closely tied to the supporting firm
(Foundation Center, 2008). For the purpose of this
article, a corporate foundation is characterized by
at least two of the following features:
•
•

•
•

We contend that the foundation-specific agency
problem resulting in increased need for accountability and transparency is more acute in the case
of corporate foundations for two reasons. First,
it is most often the firm’s managers – and not its
shareholders – who decide whether the parent
corporation will endow or fund the corporate
foundation with – ultimately – shareholder resources. Second, the corporate foundation board
– which may not necessarily include shareholders
of the parent firm – chooses the public-benefit
purposes to which those resources will be applied.

Beyond these reasons for the special relevance of
governance-related issues in corporate foundations, their appeal for practitioners is also
compounded by their fast growth and hybrid
nature. Corporate foundations have been increasingly used – in the U.S. since the 1950s; in Spain
since the late 1980s – as tax-efficient vehicles for
corporate philanthropy and institutions supporting corporate social-responsibility (CSR) strategies. Parallel to the mainstream adoption of CSR
strategies by firms around the globe, corporate
foundations have tended not only to drive the
It has been founded by a firm whose name is
philanthropic component but also to enhance
frequently part of the foundation’s name.
competitive advantage of corporate founders by
focusing on communities or stakeholders of straIt obtains the majority of its operating income
tegic interest for the firm, such as customers or
from the firm’s gifts, meaning it does not raise
employees (Carroll, 1991, 2008; Porter & Kramer,
funds either regularly or significantly.
2002, 2006; Foundation Center, 2008). In addition,
corporate foundations are public-benefit nonIts board seats owners, directors, or top manag- profits founded, funded, or controlled by profiters from the related firm.
maximizing firms. Their dynamics as hybrid
actors between the market and civil society are
It is endowed with controlling or dominant
worth being studied in the context of the growing
shareholdings of the equity of one or several
importance of hybrid institutional forms, which
firms.1

In several European countries, including Spain, there is no
cap on shareholding or voting stock ownership by founda1

THE

Corporate foundations thus show a complex
connectedness to founding corporations in terms
of governance (board control), management
(filtering of managers and other staff members),
and funding (endowment and nonendowment income), resulting in their subordinate dependence
on the firm (Rey-Garcia & Martin-Cavanna,
2011).
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tions, and regulations on self-dealing between a firm and
its related foundation are relatively looser in Europe than
in the U.S.
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cross boundaries among the three traditional
sectors of the economy (Letts, Ryan, & Grossman, 1997; Dees, 1998; Cooney, 2006; European
Venture Philanthropy Association, 2006; Martin,
2008).
The purpose of this article is precisely to explore
the forces underlying the adoption of good-governance policies and practices, particularly transparency, in charitable foundations. The next section discusses, in the context of a country study,
the main factors behind the advancement of foundation transparency according to previous theory
and research. The following section proposes a
simple tool for assessing foundation transparency. Through that tool, the stage of development
of Spanish corporate foundations’ transparency
is assessed and its evolution followed over three
years. Overall results are discussed and possible
explanations for the variability in corporate foundation transparency are explored. Finally, suggestions for foundation practitioners in general and a
set of conclusions focused on corporate foundations are presented.

4. societal pressure derived from scandals,
5. emulation, and
6. third-party assessment and information services.

This six-drivers framework will be discussed in
depth for the Spanish foundation sector. Why is
the Spanish case relevant? In continental Europe, Spain is second only to Germany as home
to a highly institutionalized foundation sector
(Rey-Garcia & Alvarez-Gonzalez, 2011a), and
has one of the highest number of registered
public-benefit foundations (12,921 in 2009) in the
European Union. From an international comparative perspective, differential features of this
medium-sized, late- and fast-growth sector refer
to age, size, and type of foundations; activity rates;
and complex relationships with the state and the
Roman Catholic Church. Spanish foundations are
mostly young, small, and operating (30 percent
of registered foundations lack significant recent
activity). Of 9,050 active foundations, 9.2 percent
are publicly controlled; an uncertain but significant number of church-controlled foundations
Drivers for Accountability and
also exist. Total expenditures exceed €150,000
Transparency: Spain as a Country Study
for 53.6 percent (for 11 percent, that figure is
Previous theoretical and research studies have
over €2.4 million); 60.1 percent have total assets
identified four main forces behind improved
of more than €150,000. Since 1994, all registered
nonprofit accountability and transparency: sofoundations in Spain have been automatically
cietal pressure derived from scandals, demands
granted charitable and nonprofit status, and can
for information from donors and other relevant
stakeholders, pressure from regulators and public receive tax exemptions and tax-deductible contriauthorities, and third-party supervision (Ebrahim, butions if they comply with certain administrative
requisites and strict reporting controls. Spanish
2010). Another useful perspective has argued
foundations are basically configured as private
that different organizations tend to adopt similar
structures due to a variety of institutional factors, entities with their own legal personality under
civil law. All of them are nonprofit distributing,
including regulatory mechanisms, emulation or
independently governed, nonmember, assetmimetic mechanisms, and standards and norms
based, and public-benefit purpose (Rey-Garcia &
arising from collective action (DiMaggio & PowAlvarez-Gonzalez, 2011b).
ell, 1991). We have combined both theoretical
perspectives into a framework composed by six
Regulatory Pressures
drivers:
It should be noted that the word “transparency”
is not even mentioned in laws and regulations
1. regulatory pressures,
applicable to Spanish foundations; regulations
focus exclusively on reporting to supervisory pub2. self-regulation,
lic authorities. All registered foundations must
annually file a report, standardized financial state3. demands for information from donors and
ments, and activities plan with the supervisory
other key stakeholders,
80
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“protectorate.” The annual report must include
information relative to governance: changes in the
board and management, degree of accomplishment of the activities plan, disaggregated number
of beneficiaries, collaboration agreements with
third parties, and degree of compliance of the
distribution or payout rule.

ency entail in practice. Such disagreement is also
evident in the wide variability of disclosure policies regarding member data by those collective
action platforms (CONGDE, 2007; Plataforma
de ONG de Acción Social 2003; AEF, 2007, 2008,
2011; Coordinadora Catalana de Funcaciones,
2009).

Once reviewed by the protectorate, those documents are filed in the corresponding foundation
“register,” where, according to the law, “anybody
can obtain information from them” (Ley 50/2002).
But as the number of foundations has increased,
supervision has become fragmented: The 58
foundation protectorates and registers are shortstaffed and information systems are poor. As a
result, the review of documents is often merely a
formality and the ostensibly public information is
hardly accessible to interested stakeholders.

Demands for Information From Donors and
Other Key Stakeholders
Demands for information from external donors
have probably been the key driver of improved
transparency among foundations that fundraise
regularly. Evidence shows an increasing number of foundations that raise funds from private
sources volunteer to be evaluated every year by
the Lealtad Foundation for compliance with 43
good-governance principles, mostly concerning
transparency (Fundacion Lealtad, 2009). It is no
coincidence that social-action and internationalcooperation nonprofits have taken a leading role
in adopting accountability and transparency
standards, given that both types heavily depend
on public funds and public agencies with tight
reporting and monitoring requirements. Furthermore, foundations competing for public funds
and private donors have already incurred the cost
of producing the relevant information, and the
incremental cost of making it accessible online to
other key stakeholders can be considered insignificant (Rey-Garcia, 2009).

Self-Regulation
Spanish nonprofits in general and foundations in
particular lack sectorwide norms and standards
for good governance and transparency (Paz, 2008;
Perdices, 2008). However, different good-governance principles, ethics codes, and transparency
tools have been progressively adopted by some
nonprofit and foundation networks coexisting
in the country (De Andrés, Martín, & Romero,
2006; CONGDE, 2007; Montserrat, 2009). The
network of international-cooperation nonprofits pioneered its first ethics code in 1998, and
published aggregated data on compliance from a
set of transparency and accountability indicators
taken from 90 websites and 50 annual reports of
member organizations (CONGDE, 2007). Socialaction nonprofits adopted an operating standard
for transparent management (Plataforma de ONG
de Acción Social, 2003). In 2008, the Spanish Association of Foundations (AEF) passed a “Principles” document (AEF, 2009), later subsumed
under a “Good Governance Code” (AEF, 2011).
This early and heterogeneous stage of development of good-governance norms and standards
arising from collective action, in the context of a
fairly structured foundation field, suggests a lack
of agreement within the sector about exactly what
good governance, accountability, and transpar-

THE
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Societal Pressures Derived From Scandals
Spain has seen a number of foundation-related
scandals in the last decade, including Gescartera
in 2001, Anesvad and Intervida in 2007, Palau in
2009, and Instituto Noos in 2011. Their epicenter
frequently has been in Catalonia, Spain’s leading region in terms of foundation reporting (it is
the only protectorate that allows online filing of
reports), strengthened regulatory requirements,
and nonprofit accountability and transparency
self-regulation (the Catalan Coordinator of
Foundations published its ethics code in 2006).
Although this coincidence may suggest some
degree of correlation between societal pressures
and improved accountability, the influence of
those scandals on foundation transparency has
not been systematically researched yet.
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Emulation
The degree to which emulation of peers or competitors with the best practices has influenced the
adoption of transparency practices by Spanish
foundations is difficult to assess except on a caseby-case basis. The scarcity of publicly accessible
information on foundations is overwhelming;
there are no countrywide directories or rankings. Spanish foundations can choose between
the favorable fiscal regime available for charitable
foundations and public benefit associations, and
the ordinary tax regime devised for any type of
organization, including businesses. However,
even if they choose the favorable fiscal regime
(which translates into foundations being fully tax
exempt in practice) their tax returns are not made
public. This situation largely differs from that of
US foundations filing their reports with the IRS,
as these are online available. As a result, Spanish
nonprofits are not listed by rating systems that are
based on private tax reports, such as GuideStar or
Charity Navigator (Rey & Alvarez, 2011c).
Third-Party Assessment
Evidence suggests three country-specific, thirdparty, private information services have provided
incentives for the advancement of foundation
transparency.
Since 2002, Lealtad Foundation has been publishing online an annual report on compliance by
fundraising foundations and associations with
transparency and other good-governance policies. Although Lealtad is neither a ranking nor
certifying body, the fast growth in the number
of nonprofits that are voluntarily adhering to
this service, and the few – though significant –
withdrawals suggest not only that private donors
respond to the information it provides, but
also that nonprofits strategically respond to its
quasi-certifying effects (Fundacion Lealtad, 2009;
Gálvez, Caba, & Lopez, 2009).

organizations including corporate foundations,
family foundations, museums, and universities;
and political parties.2
In 2009, the Spanish Association of Foundations
launched the Institute for Strategic Analysis of
Foundations (INAEF) to research foundations
in the context of acute scarcity of empirical data
on philanthropy. The institute’s main goal is to
reinforce accountability and transparency in the
sector, and it has recently published its first report
on the organizational features and socioeconomic
impact of the foundation sector (Rey & Alvarez,
2011d). 3

Proposal and Application of Transparency
Indicators
Once general forces influencing foundation
transparency have been discussed, our purpose
will be to assess the state and development of
Spanish corporate-foundation transparency and
to explore possible explanations for its variability in the context of the six-drivers framework.
When translating our definition of foundation
transparency into a useful set of transparency indicators, the main challenge is to define the extent
of “relevant” information. This requires identifying and selecting relevant internal and external
stakeholders for foundations and understanding
their specific information needs. For the sake of
simplicity, foundation transparency is defined
as voluntary dissemination through the Internet
(accessibility) of basic information about seven
categories of indicators (relevancy):
1. contact data,
2. mission,
3. programs and activities,
4. management,

Compromiso Empresarial Foundation (FCE),
5. board of trustees,
established in 2007, is an independent nonprofit
whose mission is to advance good governance
and transparency. It regularly publishes ethics and 2 http://www.fundacioncompromisoempresarial.com
3
online transparency reports benchmarking firms
The INAEF project was funded by a group of Spanish private foundations: Ramon Areces, Marcelino Botin, Rafael
such as television stations; public and nonprofit
Del Pino, ONCE, Santander, and Telefonica.
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6. economic information, and
7. governance.

responded to increased demands for substantive accountability with improved transparency
and professionalism (Frumkin, 1999).

• Sixty Spanish foundations that regularly
This approach acknowledges the growing prefundraise from nonprofits, unrelated firms,
eminence of the web as an external communicaindividuals, or the public sector (in the U.S.
tion medium for foundations, both vertically
they would probably be labeled “community” or
(with stakeholders such as donors, mass media,
“public” foundations). These foundations have
and partners), and horizontally (with peer orgavolunteered to be rated in terms of good-govnizations). The public in general and nonprofit
ernance and transparency principles by Lealtad
stakeholders in particular expect basic informaFoundation (Fundacion Lealtad, 2009). While
tion on any issue of their interest and expect it
under GuideStar or Charity Navigator nonprofto be accessible online. Of about 2,000 American
its cannot choose whether or not to be rated,
nonprofits surveyed in 2008, 93 percent provided
we argue that a foundation’s voluntary decision
information about their programs and services on
to be rated signals its commitment to transparthe web (GuideStar, 2009). Furthermore, this webency policies and practices.
based approach to transparency has been used to
evaluate publicly listed companies and nonprofits
The degree of compliance with transparency in(Sanz & Alda, 2009; CONGDE, 2007; Gálvez,
dicators within our sample was followed for three
Caba, & Lopez, 2009).
years (2009-2011). The main results are summarized in Table 1.
A sample of 50 active corporate foundations was
selected according to our working definition; a
second criterion was that it represent a diversity
Explanations for Variability in Corporateof founder types. Those types include publicly
Foundation Transparency
listed and private companies, family and nonfam- The first difference in transparency among the
ily founders, and national and international firms; three samples in 2009 relates to web usage. While
they are connected to a wide variety of industries. 98 percent of the U.S. endowed sample and 100
To assess transparency among such a sample,
percent of the Spanish fundraising sample had
we first monitored the foundations’ compliance
their own websites, only 84 percent of the corpowith transparency indicators for categories 1 to
rate sample utilized the web as an external com6 (13 items) during the second semester of 2009.
munication tool. Twenty-nine of the 50 corporate
However, transparency is a relative concept that
foundations had their own websites, whereas 14
must be contextualized within social demands for provided online information on the websites of
relevant information, institutional environments, their parent firms.
and peer/competitor practices. For this reason,
we benchmarked those results with those of two
The second difference arising from the benchother groups of foundations that can be considmarking exercise relates to the degree of compliered as conforming to best practices in terms
ance with transparency indicators. Transparency
of transparency, despite their different financial
is considerably higher for U.S. endowed and
structures and geographic context:
Spanish fundraising foundations for every item
except “CEO or managing director”; the maxi• The top 50 grantmaking foundations of the U.S. mum gap between corporate foundations and
by asset volume (Foundation Center, 2009). The the two best practices relating to items under the
U.S. was chosen as the international benchmark “economic information” category, followed by the
because its foundation sector is the largest and “board” category. Additionally, top U.S. endowed
has been a role model for foundations internafoundations outperform the Spanish foundations
tionally, particularly from a governance perwith best practices for the “management,” “board,”
spective. The U.S. sector has also successfully
and “economic information” categories. The “an-
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TABLE 1 Assessing Foundation Transparency: Benchmarking (2009) and Tracking (2009-2011) Spanish Corporate Foundations

Spanish Corporate Foundations
2009-2011

2009 Benchmarks

Transparency indicators:
Categories and items

Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
of compliant of compliant of compliant of compliant of compliant
Top 50 U.S.
Spanish
corporate
corporate
corporate
foundations fundraising foundations foundations foundations
2009
2010
2011
by asset size foundations

1. Contact data
1.1. Postal address

96%

100%

66%

78%

86%

1.2. Phone

96%

98%

62%

74%

82%

96%

100%

80%

84%

84%

3.1. Description

96%

100%

80%

86%

86%

3.2. Beneficiaries

94%

100%

72%

78%

84%

4.1. CEO or managing
director

90%

59%

58%

62%

62%

4.2. Other managerial staff

90%

47,5%

32%

32%

36%

5.1. Members

92%

87%

70%

72%

80%

5.2. Profiles

82%

84%

16%

30%

36%

5.3. Positions and
responsibilities

88%

41%

20%

66%

74%

6.1. Financial statements

74%

80%

8%

18%

24%

6.2. Annual reports

70%

23%

0%

8%

12%

6.3. External audit reports

70%

51%

4%

14%

20%

7.1. Bylaws

NA

NA

NA

NA

18%

7.2. Good-governance
code

NA

NA

NA

NA

8%

2. Mission
2.1. Mission and goals
3. Programs and activities

4. Management

5. Board of trustees

6. Economic information

7. Governance

Source: Authors’ elaboration from FCE 2010, and Martin-Cavanna 2011 and 2012

nual report” item registers the lowest degree of
compliance for both Spanish samples, implying
that the policies and processes through which
those foundations are governed (governance), the
degree to which mission and goals are achieved
(effectiveness), and the sources and uses of funds
(efficiency) cannot be assessed from online
84

available information for 100 percent of corporate foundations and 77 percent of fundraising
foundations. On the positive side, 80 percent of
Spanish fundraising foundations publish their financial statements online (outperforming the U.S.
sample on this item), and 51 percent do the same
with their external audit report. Overall, gaps
THE
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widen when the comparison is between corporate
and fundraising foundations within Spain, with 12
indicators registering two-digit differentials.
However, a general trend for improvement
of corporate foundation transparency can be
observed over time. Most substantial advances –
with two-digit increases between 2009 and 2011
– have involved “contact data,” “board,” and, to a
lesser extent, “economic” indicators. The number
of corporate foundations publishing their annual
reports online has increased from none to six.
The “economic information” category, however,
remains the lowest compliant, and it has taken
three years to reach percentages comparable to
those of the new “governance” category introduced in 2011.

this type of foundation, despite the general trend
toward improvement over time.
Regarding mimetic mechanisms, in the case of
corporate foundations both imitation of peer
foundations and eventual emulation of parent corporations should be considered. On the
one hand, some corporate foundations identify
themselves as “fourth sector” entities given their
hybrid nature; on the other hand and according to
theory, the greater the dependence for resources
of an organization on another organization, the
more similar the dependent organization will become to the organization providing the resources
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Surprisingly enough,
an average-to-average comparison for 2009 does
not support the hypothesis of corporate foundations emulating parent corporations in terms of
transparency. While corporate foundations underperformed both U.S. and Spanish foundations
with the best practices, the majority of parent
firms ranked among the best in good-governance,
transparency, and CSR practices in the country at
that time (Rey-Garcia & Martin-Cavanna, 2011).

Going back to our proposed six-drivers framework, some of those drivers seem of limited
application when exploring possible explanations
for the state and evolution of transparency practices among Spanish corporate foundations. No
regulations specifically reinforcing transparency
by corporate foundations exist, and they share the
By contrast, emulation of peer foundations in
regulatory vacuum with other types of foundations. None of the recent foundation-related scan- combination with a third-party information
service specifically focusing on corporate foundadals has directly involved corporate foundations.
tions has probably been a significant force behind
the gradual improvement of transparency beThe existence of demands for information from
tween 2009 and 2011. Compromiso Empresarial
donors, however, is relevant when trying to
Foundation has published an annual benchmarkexplain why fundraising foundations outperform
ing report on corporate-foundation transparency
corporate ones in our benchmarking exercise.
since early 2010 (FCE, 2010; Martin-Cavanna
Spanish fundraising foundations seem to have
2011, 2012). Although the report is distributed
understood that satisfying the demands for acboth online and in print, exposure of its ratings
cessible and relevant information from external
through mainstream media has amplified its imdonors, either public or private, increases their
pact. Expansión, an economic newspaper widely
funding opportunities through improved legiticirculated among Spanish companies, and Antena
macy. It is no coincidence that internationalcooperation and social-services foundations, both 3 TV, a private television station with its own corheavily dependent on fundraising, have paved the porate foundation, have provided news coverage
on the report (Medina, 2010; A. G., 2011; Antena
way in both self-regulatory efforts and voluntary
adherence to private-information systems. Corpo- 3 TV, 2011, 2012). Evidence suggests a clear relationship between the release and content of the
rate foundations have not led any self-regulatory
report and the strategic responses by corporate
initiatives. They lack the built-in incentive for
foundations included in its comparative rating.
accountability that public foundations have in a
diversified income structure based on fundraising There were more email requests from foundations
from multiple sources. It is no coincidence either seeking further information, and more website
that the “economic information” category of indi- visits to download the report. In addition, more
cators still remains the most underperforming for than 30 percent of the corporate foundations in
THE
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our sample have directly contacted FCE to ask for
advice or clarification on transparency criteria
applied by the report. And it is also significant
that, after FCE advanced plans to evaluate online
availability of good-governance codes in the 2011
edition, three foundations elaborated ex novo
their codes and subjected them to board approval just in time to comply with that indicator.
Finally, feedback from practitioners of corporate
foundations covered by the report emphasized
the incentives it has provided for continuous
improvement:

practical implications of good governance, poor
accessibility of public data in foundation registers,
and privacy provisions governing foundation tax
returns.

We want to acknowledge the work behind the report
as it stimulates Spanish corporate foundations to advance towards improved levels of transparency, and
according to the most demanding standards.

On the positive side, applying the six-drivers
framework to corporate foundations demonstrates the potential of third-party assessment
and information services for advancing transparency in the absence of specific regulations, widely
accepted norms and standards, societal pressures,
and built-in incentives related to the financial
structure of the foundation. The positive impact
of the FCE annual benchmarking reports and
ratings on continuous improvement of corporate
foundation transparency has been threefold: They
have proposed a set of indicators to help foundations select “relevant” information; they have
provided incentives for putting preexisting contents (i.e. bylaws, financial statements) online; and
they have provided incentives for the adoption of
new good-governance policies. Furthermore, the
report’s benchmarking methodology has stimulated emulation among corporate foundations,
reminding them that, although closely held, they
still have multiple relevant stakeholders beyond
the parent company. Satisfying their demands
requires specific commitments from corporate
foundation boards and managers beyond behaving accountably to the founding firm.

Regarding our benchmarking exercise focusing
on corporate foundations, it suggests that differences in the financial structures of foundations
compound with institutional factors to influence
the development of transparency practices. Since
corporate foundations do not raise funds from
external donors, either private or public, they lack
the intrinsic incentive for transparency that charWe read the news about the report in Expansión and acterizes fundraising or public foundations. In
it opened our eyes. We try to improve our rating a bit other words, corporate foundations – like other
private, closely held ones – may have a higher
every year.
intrinsic risk of behaving accountably only to the
founders and funders they depend on financially,
Congratulations for the report. It is an excellent rerather than to the foundation’s external stakeholdport that should help all foundations that really care
ers and to society in general.
about transparency.

The report will be a really useful tool to improve our
website.
Thanks for the report. We should improve, and I am
confident we will start to do so next year. … We are
thinking about the actions we should take in order to
improve online transparency relative to our compliance of indicators in 2011. We would appreciate detailed recommendations on the following proposed
solutions….

Conclusions and Suggestions for
Practitioners
The first contribution of this article has been to
propose a six-drivers framework that can help
explain variations in foundation accountability
and transparency, both across different institutional settings and over time. Conclusions for
the Spanish case suggest that obstacles to the
advancement of foundation transparency include
a lack of awareness of the concept by regulators,
fragmented and heterogeneous self-regulatory
initiatives that lack compliance and monitoring mechanisms, a lack of consensus about the
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For foundation practitioners, the main challenge
to improving transparency is selecting relevant
information for each stakeholder group and comTHE
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municating it in an accessible way. In this sense, a
key contribution of this article is combining a set
of categories and indicators of relevant information into a simple tool for assessing the state and
development of transparency practices by all types
of foundations in any country.
This article also reminds board members and
managers that the Internet, and more specifically
the foundation website, has become the main
channel to respond transparently to demands for
information from key stakeholders and society
in general. Any stakeholder who wants to know
more about a foundation will first consult its
website. While a foundation may behave accountably to its civil or tax authority or to its internal donors, it may not be accountable to other
stakeholders or to the public unless it voluntarily
implements accountability and transparency practices through the web.
Our final suggestion is that founding companies
advocate for voluntary implementation of good
governance, accountability, and transparency
practices in the foundations under their control. This research demonstrates that channeling
corporate philanthropy through the creation of
organizations with their own legal personality
requires implementing ad hoc good-governance
policies beyond those of the parent corporation.
One of the main advantages of corporate philanthropy over other CSR strategies is its observable
nature – most CSR processes are not noticeable
beyond the limits of the firm. Visible adoption of
best accountability and transparency practices
by corporate foundations would bring two types
of positive consequences: It would improve the
legitimacy of corporate foundations in the eyes of
external stakeholders and society in general, and
would prevent diluting potential benefits to the
reputation of corporate philanthropy, ultimately
increasing the credibility and social impact of the
parent company’s CSR strategies.
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